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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 4, 1985 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 84-679-CFX
Rich-

Cert to CA9
(Anderson, Schroeder, & Alarcon)

ards,

v.
Berner et a

1.

Federal/Civil

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr alleges that CA9 erred in reversing

the DC's dismissal of a suit brought by recipients of inside in-

l

formation against the tipsters.

(

CA9 held that the doctrine of in

@ri delicto did not apply to shield securities professionals and

____

corporate officers from the consequences of their fraudulent rnis___,.
representations.

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Resps received what they

-;:::::::;::=-

believed to be material inside information regarding a mining
venture by the T.O.N.M. Corp.

They proceeded to buy this corp.'s

stock on the open market in anticipation of large profits.
apparently bought the stock at approximately $1.50/share.
market price eventually rose to $7.00/share.

Resps
The

Subsequently, the

corporation announced that the mining venture would not go forward and the price of its stock fell to under $1.00/share.
Resps then filed suit under §lO(b) of the Securities
/

Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. The defendants (now petrs) were one

~

Charles Lazzaro, a registered broker, and one Leslie Neadeau,
President of T.O.N.M .•

Resps alleged that the two conspired to

manipulate the market price of T.O.N.M. stock by disseminating
false information on the pretext that it was inside information.
Lazzaro allegedly induced resps to buy T.O.N.M. stock by telling
them that he knew Neadeau personally and had inside information
an the mining venture.

When resps sought to confirm Lazzaro's

information by calling Neadeau, he allegedly would neither confirm nor deny it, but said that the information was "not public
knowledge" and that Lazarro was a "trustworthy and good man."
The DC dismissed the suit on the ground that resps were

m pari

delicto with Lazarro and Neadeau.

Noting that the corn-

plaint admitted resps' reliance on inside information, the DC

held that the suit was automatically barred.

CA9 reversed. · It

noted that this Court has not considered the application of the

m pari

delicto defense as an absolute bar to private actions

under the federal securities statutes, and that it has not apPlied the doctrine in private antitrust actions.
flers v. International Parts Corp., 392

u.s.

Perma Life Muf-

134 (1968).

More-

over, CA9 reasoned that if the facts alleged in the complaint
were true, the investors could not possibly be equally at fault
with petrs.

Protection of the investing public is the goal of

the Securities Exchange Act, and this legislative purpose would
be hindered by sanctioning the investors in this case.
~9

Finally,

recognized that its decision conflicted with that in Tarasi

v. Pittsburgh National Bank, SSS F.2d 11S2 (CA3), cert. denied,
434

u.s.

96S (1977) and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700

(CAS 1969) •
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that CA9 erred in refus-

ing to apply the doctrine of in pari delicto to dismiss resps'
suit.

Given the conflict in the circuits on this question, the

Court should take the case to ensure uniform treatment of tippers
in actions brought against tippees.
4.

DISCUSSION:

As CA9 recognized, its decision square-

ly conflicts with those of CAS and CA3.

This conflict has re-

sulted as the CAs have attempted to follow this Court's reasoning
in Perma Life Mufflers.
Although CA9's view of Perma Life Mufflers was reasonable, I don't think that case necessarily leads to CA9's result.
In Perma Life, the Court held that the common law doctrine of in

pa':je

't.

pari delicto was not a defense to a private antitrust action.
The Court ' reasoned that "the purposes of the antitrust laws are
best served by insuring that the private action will be an everpresent threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in

u.s.,

violation of the antitrust laws." 392

at 139.

Accordingly,

it allowed plaintiffs to challenge a number of restraints of
trade, even though as dealers of the defendants' merchandise they
had agreed to these restrictive practices.

There were five opin-

ions in this case, all which supported the Court's judgment at
least in part.
CA3 in Tarasi, supra, thought Perma Life did not bar
the defense of in pari delicto in a tipper/tippee situation such
as that here, because "Perma Life emphasized the fact that the
participation by the plaintiffs in the unlawful agreement was
passive, and perhaps coerced."

In these circumstances, the ap-

plication of the in pari delicto doctrine would not deter future
violations, while the application of the treble damages remedy of
the antitrust laws would.

CA3 thought that the case of a tippee

acting on false "inside information" was distinguishable.

In

such a case, the application of the doctrine would deter the use
of the information: if the doctrine did not apply, a tippee would

have less incentive not to use the information since he might
have recourse against the tipper if the information proved false.
Jccord, Kuehnert, supra.
Other circuits, most notably CA2, have decisions going
both ways on this question.

See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615

u.s.

F.2d 68, 76 (1980}, cert. denied, 449
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These decisions have weighed the public policy interests in enforcing the securities statutes against the policy served by not
letting a wrongdoer profit by his actions.

In so doing, they

considered the relative fault of the parties on the particular
facts of these cases.
The issue presented by this petition is important and
recurring, and the CAs have decided it in conflicting ways.
~--------------

Thus, I recommend calling for a response.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

1

-------··

1

recommen~

There is no response.
December 5, 1984

Levins

Opin in petn

aml
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To:
Justice Powell
From: Annmarie
Re:
No. 84-679, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards v. Berner et al
The petition seeks review of CA9's holding that the doctrine of
in pari delicto does not apply to shield securities professionals
and corporate officers from liability for fraudulent tips. You
called for a response, which has been received.
The response is very good, arguing strenuously that there is no
real conflict and that the CA9's holding makes good sense.
It is
very persuasive, and I think it may be possible to read CA9's
decision as only minimally in conflict with the decisions of CA3
and CAS. Still, I think there is some conflict, and that this
Court's fragmented decision in Perma Life Mufflers will continue
to generate conflict. Thus, I would join three to grant.
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84-679

Bateman Eichler, et al. v. Berner, et al. (CA9}

MEMO TO FILE
This case was granted to resolve a conflict among the
circuits.

The decision of

CA9

appears

to

stand

alone,

contrary to decisions by CA3, 5 and 11.
The respondents (sometimes referred to as plaintiffs}
filled

a

complaint

alleging

that

employed

by

under

§105-B of

Charles

Lazzaro,

petitioner

in

this

the

a

Securities

registered

case

(defendant

Act

broker
in

the

suit}, and Leslie Neadeau, president of T.O.N.M. Oil and
Gas Exploration Corp.
defraud

them

by

(TONM or the company}, conspired to

making

misrepresentations

them

to purchase T.O.N.M.

that

Lazzaro,

stock,

in

represented

order

stock.

to

that

induced

The complaint alleges

induce

the

that

them

company

to purchase

had

found

gold

the
in

Surinam;

that the company would announce a joint-venture

with St.

Josephs Mining and Mineral Company to mine the

gold; and that the value of the company's stock would rise
dramatically
Plaintiffs
Lazzaro's

as

a

purchased

result
the

information was

of

stock

these
"on

the

developments.
premise"

that

"not information available to

2.

the general public".
amount of

stock

information.
per share.

The plaintiffs bought a substantial

without disclosing

The market price

that

rose

they had

from

inside

$1.50 to $7.00

But the price fell to $1.00 per share when no

joint-venture

resulted

and

the

company

announced

that

there would be none.

In short,
their

this is a suit by admitted tippees against

alleged

defendants

tippers,

that

defendant

violates

(petitioner

California,

action

moved

the

here),

to

by

a

dismiss

both

plaintiffs

Securities
large
on

Law.

brokerage

the

and
The

firm

ground

that

in
the

tippees were in pari delicto with the tippers (namely, the
broker Lazzaro and the president of TONM Company.
Apparently
necessary

to

an

the
in

complaint
pari

sets

forth

delicto defense,

all

the

provided

facts
such

defense is available in a suit under the Securities Acts.
More

specifically,

Lazzaro

is

alleged

to

have

induced

plaintiffs to purchase the stock by telling them that he
knew

the

learned

company's
the

president

non-public
that

personally,

information

the stock would

from

officers,

and

when the

joint-venture was announced.

that
the

he

had

company's

increase dramatically
Plaintiffs got in

3.
.

'

touch with Neadeau to varify the accuracy of
Although

Neadeau

accuracy,
public

would

neither

he volunteered

knowledge"

that

confirm

such

the

nor

"tips.

deny

the

information was

"not

and that Lazzaro was "very trustworthy

and a good man".
Accepting allegations of the complaint as true on the
motion to dismiss, the DC - relying on decisions from the
3rd

and

alleged

5th

Circuits

fraud

in

-

held

that

connection

with

in

lOB-S

the

actions

use

of

for

insider

information, tippees are barred by the doctrine of in pari
delicto

from

suing

the

The

tipper.

District

Court

concluded:

"There
the
is
no
question
that
if
allegations of the complaint are true, both
plaintiffs
and
defendants
violated
the
which
under
provision
particular
statutory
recovery is sought (in this suit) •
The Court of

Appeals

for

the

9th Circuit reversed,

concluding that "a duped investor is not equally at fault
in the fraud purpotrated against him by his broker or an
insider";

that

the

doctrine

in

pari

dilecto

generally

requires equal fault on both sides; and may not apply at
all

to

a

suit

under

the

Securities

Act.

The

court

4.

recognized that its decision conflicted with that of other
circuit

courts

decision
Corp.,

392

action,
of

in

of

Perma

u.s.

appeals.
Life

134,

CA9

Mufflers

that

relied
v.

involved

on

this

Court's

International
a

private

Parts

antitrust

a case in which the Court held that the doctrine

in pari dilecto did not apply to a private antitrust

action.

The foregoing is not a complete summary of this case.
Nor have I discussed the relevance of various provisions
of

I

the Securities Act.

am inclined to think that the

common law doctrine of in pari dilecto should be available
as

a

defense

when

the

tippee

and

the

tipper

admittedly violated the Federal Securities Law.
understand

CA9 's

reasoning

that

the

tipper

each

I do not

is

more

at

fault than the tippee even thought the latter knew he had
received
in

inside

violation

of

information and extensively traded on it
the

law.

This

trading

defrauded

the

persons from whom the tippees purchased the stock though
in this case,

where

the

tip turned out to be

incorrect,

the persons who sold their stock were fortunate.
Having expressed these tentative views, this is a new
question

for

me.

I

will want

a

summary bench memo and

5.
'

.

also will take a closer look at the briefs.
both of the opinions below rather carefully.

~·· ;·

I have read

BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 84-6 79
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner
April 3, 1985

Dan

Question Presented

Whether

an employee of

a

brokerage

firm who in-

duces investors to purchase stock by deliberately misrepresenting that he is communicating material nonpublic information about the company can avoid lOb-S liability to those
investors on the ground that the defrauded investors were

page 2.

No. 84-6 79

in pari delicto with him because they purchased securities
on the false premise that they were tippees?

I. Background.

Resps filed a complaint under various sections of
the securities acts alleging that one Lazzaro, an employee
of petr, and one Neadeau, president of T.O.N.M. Oil & Gas
Exploration Corporation
by

inducing

them

to

(TONM),

purchase

conspired to defraud
TONM

them

Specifically,

stock.

they alleged that Lazzaro represented to them that he had
learned

from TONM' s

- ----

president or

vice-president,

.

whom he claimed were personal friends,

both of

that TONM had ac-

-

quired the rights to a large gold discovery and was prepar-

-----

ing to mine it.

Lazzaro told resps that the discovery and

preparations were not publicly known and that the price of
TONM's stock would rise dramatically.
Neadeau

in order

to verify

these

neither confirm nor deny them.

Resps then contacted
Neadeau

claims.

would

Instead, he merely stated

that they "were not public knowledge."

Neadeau was specif-

ically advised that resps were dealing with Lazzaro and he
told them "that he could say that Lazzaro was very trustworthy

and

a

good man."

Resps

admit

in

their

complaint

that they purchased the stock "on the premise that Lazzaro
was privy to certain information not otherwise available to
the general public."

They lost their shirts when TONM an-

nounced that there would be no mining venture.

No. 84-679

page 3.

The DC dismissed under Rule 12(b) (6) because resps
were in pari delicto with petr.
insider

information

is

It stated that "trading on

itself a violation of rule lOb-S"

and that resps had admitted in their complaint "that they
acted on insider information (albeit false information) and
therefore were tippees."

The DC refused to assess the rel-

ative fault of the parties on the ground that "both plain----.A

tiffs and defendants violated the particular statutory provision under which recovery is sought."

---

The CA9 reversed.
cases,

-

Following its rule in antitrust c/-?~

it held that "the doctrine of in pari delicto does

not apply where the facts show that the plaintiff is less
than co-equally responsible for his injury."
for Cert.
defense

A6.

could

App. to Pet.

It then held as a matter of law that the
not

apply

under

the

circumstances of

this

case:
"In the matter before us, the complaint alleges that the fraudulent scheme was or ig ina ted
by the broker and his coconspirators to manipulate the market price of T.O.N.M. stock for their
financial benefit.
The complaint further provides that the investors acted in reliance on
these representations without knowledge of the
true facts.
The allegations of the complaint, if
proved, would demonstrate that the investors
could not have been equally responsible for the
injury they suffered as a result of this fraudulent scheme. Therefore, the complaint should not
have been dismissed on the basis of in pari delicto." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The CA9 then went on to discuss how allowing the defense in
cases like this would frustrate the purposes of the securi-

-

ties

laws.

Finally,

it

admitted

that

its

decision con-

flicted with that reached by two other circuits:

Tarasi v.

-

No. 84-679

page 4.

Pittsburgh
nied,

National Bank,

u.s.

434

965

555 F.2d 1152

(CA3), cert.

de-

(1977), and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,

412 F.2d 700 CAS 1969).

II. Discussion.

Under
Parts Corp.,

Penna Life Mufflers,

392

u.s.

134

(1968)

Inc.

v.

International

(holding in pari delicto

defense unavailable in certain antitrust actions), deciding
to allow an
______________.

whether

in pari delicto defense in this case

involves three separate issues:
culpable?

(ii)

was

it

at

( i) was the resps' conduct

least

as

culpable

as

petr's

conduct? and (iii) would allowing the defense frustrate the
purposes of the securities laws?

Only if the answer to the

first two questions is 'yes' and that to the third is 'no'
should the defense apply.
Although neither party really discusses the issue,
there is some question whether after Dirks v. SEC, 463

u.s.

646 (1983), resps' tippee trading, as described in the cornplaint,

actually violates

the securities laws.

In Dirks,

the Court held that trading on material nonpublic inforrnation without disclosure did not
rities laws.

b~ it~~f

Rather, an individual who trades OQ such in-

formation without disclosure violates
violates

a

violate the secu-

II

separate duty' ' to disclose

the laii ong if he
or

abstain--a duty

---------~

that
may arise either from his own relationship to the corn....___........
duty owed to the company b

No. 84-679

page 5.

the individual who gave him such information.

As you wrote

in Dirks:
"a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material
nonpublic information onl
hen the ins· d
has
breached his fi c ·a
y to the shareholders
by disc osing the information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach." Slip op. at 13 (emphasis added).
The question here is whether it is clear from the face of
the complaint itself that resps knew or should have known
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty.
Lazzaro
Lazzaro,

a

and

Neadeau's

nonfiduciary,

scheme

was

quite

gave resps the false

clever.

information

while Neadeau, a fiduciary, never explicitly confirmed it.

-

Had Neadeau not called Lazzaro "trustworthy and a good man"
when contacted by resps

for verification and had Lazzaro

not claimed to be a personal friend of insiders in TONM, it
would be unclear whether resps should have known there was
a breach of fiduciary duty.

I believe, however, that these

remarks by Lazzaro and Neadeau are sufficient as a matter

----------------------

-----------~-------------

of law to have put resps on notice that there had been a

-

breach

of

---

--------------------duty.
Under Dirks,

fiduciary

then,

resps

did

violate the securities laws in trading on material nonpublie information.
Although
that

they

were

the

were

culpable,

I

do

not

least as culpable as petr.
-courts have traditionally considered

__________....,

thing,

resps

believe
For

at

a

one

plain-

tiff's fault as less than a defendant's in cases where the

1rV'? plaintiff

was

induced

through

the

defendant's

fraudulent

No. 84-679

page 6.

representations to participate in the unlawful scheme.
Pomeroy,

J.

A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence

§942a,

3
at

(5th ed. 1941); accord National Bank & Loan Co. v. Pe-

741

trie, 189
fraud]

u.s.

423, 425 (1903)

(the "usual consequence [of

is that as between the parties the one who is de-

frauded

has

a

right,

former position").

if possible,

to be

restored to his

For another, Congress has recognized by

-----

imposing civil penalties on nontrading tippers in §2 of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1894, Pub. L. No. 98-376,
§2,

98 Stat. 1264, that tippers are more responsible than

tippees for insider trading frauds:
"'Tippers' often obtain material nonpublic information as a result of a position of trust and
confidence.
Absent the tipper's misconduct, the
tippee's trading would not occur.
Thus, the new
civil penalty would be imposed upon those persons
most directly culpable in a violation."
H.R.
Rep. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 9 (1983) (emphasis added).
Still another reason to hold tippers more culpable is that
under

Dirks

abstain.

they have

a more direct duty

to disclose or

The

tippee's duty is derivative of theirs and
---------~--------------------Finally, tipper-brokers are
accordingly more attenuated.
-------------------~

in a special position.

Brokers,

because of their special

role in securities trading, have traditionally been held to
higher

standards

of

integrity

than

individual

investors.

(Witness the many special provisions in the securities laws
governing brokers' conduct.)

In fact, the only real argu-

ment petr can make for considering resps' culpability to be
equal to its own is that resps broke the same law in the
same

scheme.

By

itself,

however,

this

is

usually

not

No. 84-679

page 7.

enough to invoke the in pari delicto defense.

1 J. Story,

Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §300 (13th ed. 1886).
The final

issue is whether application of the in

pari delicto defense would

advance or

poses of the securities laws.
them for

two reasons.

frustrate

the pur-

I believe it would frustrate

~, it seems to me that illegal

tippee trading is more effectively deterred by aiming the
Exposing

sanctions at the tipper rather than the tippee.

the tipper to liability from the tippee can stop the dissemination of material nonpublic information at the source.
Insulating

the

tipper

from

such

liability,

on

the

other

hand, removes all disincentives, except for the risk of SEC
sanctions,

for

the

tipper

not

to

manipulate

the

market.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether placing the risk of loss
on

the

tippee

would

really

have

any

deterrent

effect.

Since scienter is required under Rule lOb-S, the only addi----------------~

-

'-

.

tional deterrent effect allowing an in pari delicto defense
would have on tippees would arise from their fear that tippers

would

especially
trust

intentionally deceive
broker-tippers,

relative

to

the

them.

usually

tippee,

Because

occupy

a

tippers,

position

of

this additional deterrence

would probably be minimal.
Second,

disallowing

the

in pari

delicto defense

would lead to better exposure of frauds perpetrated on the
public.

If tippers can claim the defense, there is no in-

centive for tippees to sue them and bring frauds to light.
Tippees would have little to gain by exposing the fraud and

No. 84-679

page 8.

could lose much by exposing their own potentially illegal
conduct.
of

a

Thus, allowing the defense would hinder exposure

type of

difficult

fraud

to detect.

that would otherwise seem to be very
Such

a

result

would

frustrate

not

only SEC enforcement but also private actions by other individual investors who may have been defrauded through no
fault of their own.

Letting frauds easily surface to pub-

lic

strongly further

knowledge

would

the purposes of

securities laws.

Recommendation

I recommend affirming the judgment of the CA9.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-679
BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS,
INCORPORATED, PETITIONER v.
CARL F. BERNER ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the common-law in ari delicto defense bars a r1va e ama es
action under the e era securities laws against coryorate
insfde.rs ana broker-dealers who traudufentl i a e investQi;"ies by niiSrepresenting that they are
conveying material nonpublic information about the issuer.

I
The respondent investors filed this action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,
alleging that they incurred substantial trading losses as a
result of a conspiracy between Charles Lazzaro, a registered
securities broker employed by the petitioner Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler), and Leslie
Neadeau, President ofT. 0. N. M. Oil & Gas Exploration
Corporation (TONM), to induce them to purchase large quantities of TONM over-the-counter stock by divulging false and
materially incomplete information about the company on the
pretext that it was accurate inside information. 1 Specifi1 The investors named Lazzaro, Neadeau, TONM, and Bateman Eichler
as defendants. Complaint ~~5-8, App. 7-8. The investors charged that
Neadeau and TONM had "directly and indirectly participated with, aided
and abetted, and conspired with" Lazzaro in the scheme. Id. ~9, App. 8;
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cally, Lazzaro is all,egeg to have told the respondents that he
personally knew TONM insiders and had learned, inter alia,
that (a) "[ v]ast amounts of gold had been discovered in Surinam, and TONM had options on thousands of acres in goldproducing regions of Surinam"; 2 (b) the discovery was "not
publicly known, but would subsequently be announced"; (c)
TONM was currently engaged in negotiations with other
c;ompanies to form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese
gold; and (d) when this information was made public, "TONM
stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share,
would increase in value from $10 to $15/share within a short ·
period of time and ... might increase to $100/share" within
a year.
omplamt ~~16-17, App. 10-12. 3 Some of the
respond en s contac ed Neadeau and inquired whether Lazzaro's tips were accurate; Neadeau stated that the information was "not public knowledge" and "would neither confirm
see also id. 1140, App. 17. Bateman Eichler's liability was premised on its
status as a "controlling person" of Lazzaro within the meaning of § 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U. S. C. § 78t(a).
Complaint 11115, 39, App. 7, 16-17. Seen. 26, infra.
Although Lazzaro, Neadeau, and TONM also are respondents in this
Court, see Sup. Ct. Rule 19.6, we shall use "respondents" to refer exclusively to the investor plaintiffs, who are defending the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this Court.
2
Gold exploration has been conducted in Surinam for more than 100
years, but production has declined dramatically since early in this century.
Complaint 1111, App. 9. The areas in which TONM had been engaged in
exploration "were historically mined by Surinamese natives using
primative methods," and were accessible to the outside world "primarily
by motorized canoes and helicopter." !d. 1112, App. 9. Lazzaro allegedly
told the investors that TONM's discovery "compared favorably to, if not
better than, those in South Africa," and that development "would not
require deep mining" because "(g]eologists in Surinam were finding gold
nuggets in dry creek beds." Id. 1116, App. 11.
3
Lazzar~lso ~dly told the investors that, after the announcement,
TONM s areho ers "would automatically receive" additional stock in
TONM's subsidiary, International Gold ·and Diamond Exploration Corp.,
Inc., "without the payment of any additional monies." Ibid. (emphasis in
original).
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nor deny those claims," but allegedly advised that "Lazzaro
was a very trustworthy and a good man." !d. ~ 19, App. 12.
The respondents admitted in their com laint that they purchased TONM stock, muc o 1t through Lazzaro, "on the
premise that Lazzaro was privy to certain information not
otherwise available to the general public." !d. ~ 15, App. 10.
Their shares initially increased dramatically in price, but ultimately declined to substantially below the purchase price
when the joint mining venture fell through. Id. ~~22-26,
App. 13-14. 4
Lazzaro and Neadeau ar~to have made the repre- ·
sentations set forth above knowing that the representations
"were untrue and/or contained only half-truths, material
omissions of fact and falsehoods,'' 5 intending that the respondents would rely thereon, and for the purpose of "influenc[ing] and manipulat[ing] the price of TONM stock" so as
"to profit themselves through the taking of commissions and
secret profits." Id. ~~23, 30, 38, App. 13, 15-16. 6 There• The respondents purchased the stock in late 1979 and early 1980 for
between $1.50 and $3.00 per share, and the price of the stock rose to $7.00
per share by the fourth quarter of 1980. !d. ~ 22, App. 13. "[S]ome or
all" of the respondents claim to have told Lazzaro at this time that they
wanted to sell their shares, but "Lazzaro stated that he would let the plaintiffs know when to sell the TONM stock, and that they should not sell just
because the stock had reached $7.00/share because it would go higher still."
Ibid. The stock then plummeted "to approximately $1.00 per share" by
the end of 1980, and fell to "less than $1.00 a share" early the next year.
!d. ~~ 24-25, App. 14.
5
In the alternative, Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made
these representations "recklessly with wanton disregard for the truth."
!d. ~ 32, App. 15.
6
Neadeau is alleged to have owned approximately 100,000 shares of the
outstanding common stock of TONM, and Lazzaro is alleged to have "controlled over a million shares of TONM stock through stocks purchased by
himself and his clients." !d. ~~ 8, 23, App. 8, 13. See also id. ~ 16, App.
12 ("Lazzaro and his relatives owned a large block of TONM stock"). The
investors charged that "Lazzaro could thereby and did influence and
manipulate the price of TONM stock through purchases and sales thereof,
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spondents contended that this scheme violated, inter alia,
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891,
15 U. S.C. §78j(b), 7 and SEC Rule 10b--5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b--5 (1984). 8 They sought capital losses and lost profits, punitive damages, and costs and
attorney's fees. App. ~26:..:.._- - - - - - - - - - ,
The District Court ismissed the complai for failure to
state a claim. The cou reasoned t at rading on insider
information is itself a violation of rule 10b--5" and that the
9

and through the dissemination of false infonnation to plaintiffs and others."
ld. 1123, App. 13.
7
That section provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
8
That rule provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
9
In addition, the respondents sought recovery pursuant to § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), see
Complaint 111148-50, App. 20, which the parties and the courts below have
treated as comparable to § 10(b) for purposes of applying the in pari delicto
defense. We express no view as to whether a private right of action exists
under § 17(a). Compare Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F. 2d 413, 416 (CA5 1983),
with Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. , 652 F. 2d 808, 815 (CA9
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allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the respondents themselves had "violated the particular provision under
which recovery is sought." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.
Thus, the court concluded, the respondents were in pari delicto with Lazzaro and Neadeau and absolutely barred from
recovery. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 730
F. 2d 1319 (1984). Although it assumed that the respondents had violated the federal securities laws, id., at 1324, the
court nevertheless concluded that "securities professionals .
and corporate officers who have allegedly engaged in fraud
should not be permitted to invoke the in pari delicto doctrine
to shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudulent misrepresentation," id., at 1320. The Court of Appeals
noted that this Court had sharply restricted the availability
of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, see Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S.
134 (1968), and concluded that, essentially for three reasons,
there was no basis "for creating a different rule for private
actions initiated under the federal securities laws," 730 F. 2d,
at 1322. First, the court reasoned that, in cases such as this,
defrauded tippees are not in fact "equally responsible" for the
violations they allege. I d., at 1322. Second, the court believed that allowing the defense in these circumstances would
be "totally incompatible with the overall aims of the securities law" because the threat of a private damages action is
necessary to deter "insider-tipster[s]" from defrauding the
public. Id., at 1323. Finally, the court noted the availability of means other than an outright preclusion of suit to
deter tip pees from trading on inside information. I d., at
1324, n. 3.
The lower courts have divided over the proper scope of the
1981). The respondents also alleged various other federal claims and
pendent state-law claims that are not before us.
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in pari delicto defense in securities litigation. 10 We granted
certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1985). We affirm.
II

The common-law defense at issue in this case derives from
the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: "in a
case of equal fault the position of the defending party is the
better one." 11 The defense is grounded on two premises:
first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; 12 and second, that denying
0

See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d 1152 (CA3)
(allowing defense), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 965 (1977); Malamphy v. RealTex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975) (per curiam) (sustaining
submission of defense to jury); Woolf v. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591,
601-605 (CA5 1975) (rejecting defense on facts of case), on reh'g, 521 F. 2d
225, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976);
Keuhnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d 700 (CA5 1969) (allowing defense);
Kirkland v. E. F . Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 433-437 (ED Mich.
1983) (rejecting defense on motion for summary judgment); Grumet v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (NJ 1983) (allowing
defense); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882,
884-887 (SD Fla. 1981) (rejecting defense on motion to dismiss); Moholt v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (DC 1979) (rejecting defense
on motion for summary judgment); In re Haven Industries, Inc ., 462 F .
Supp. 172, 177-180 (SDNY 1978) (allowing defense); Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (SDNY 1971) (rejecting defense);
Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F. R. D. 89 (SDNY 1970) (denying motion to
strike defense). Cf. Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
710 F. 2d 678, 691 (CA111983); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F. 2d 68,
76 (CA21980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981); Can-Am Petroleum Co.
v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373 (CAlO 1964).
11
Black's Law Dictionary 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1977).
12
See, e. g., Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671, 685 (1886); Austin's
Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'r, 11 Va. 33, 47 (1806) ("He who comes here for
relief must draw his justice from pure fountains"). See also Holman v.
Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K. B. 1775):
"The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is
not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed . . . . The
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio [out of fraud
'
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judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means
of deterring illegality. 13 In its classic formulation, the in
pari delicto defense was narrowly limited to situations where
the plaintiff truly bore at least equal responsibility for his
injury, because "in cases where both parties are in delicto,
concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that
they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are,
very different degrees in their guilt." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 304-305 (1886) (Story).
Thus there might be an "inequality of condition" between the
parties, id., at 305, or "a confidential relationship between .
th[em]" that determined their "relative standing" before a
court, 3 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence
§ 942a, at 741 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy). In addition, the
public policy considerations that undergirded the in pari delicto defense were frequently construed as precluding the defense even where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his
injury: "there may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public policy in
many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties
may be." 1 Story 305. Notwithstanding these traditional
limitations, many courts have given the in pari delicto defense a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved generally in "the same sort of wrongdoing" as defendants. · Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
no action arises] . . . . It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the
sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a
plaintiff."
8
' See, e. g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-670 (1898):
"To refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the
enforcement of his alleged rights under it tends strongly towards reducing
the number of such transactions to a minimum. The more plainly parties
understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place
themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined will they be
to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid
adherence to the law."

84-679-0PINION
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International Parts Corp., 392 U. S., at 138. 14
In Perma Life, we emphasized "the inappropriateness of
invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private
suit serves important public purposes." 392 U. S., at 138.
That case involved a treble-damages action against a Midas
Muffler franchisor by several of its dealers, who alleged that
the franchise agreement created a conspiracy to restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 The
lower courts barred the action on the grounds that the dealers, as parties to the agreement, were in pari delicto with
the franchisor. In reversing that determination, the opinion ·
for this Court emphasized that there was no indication that
Congress had intended to incorporate the defense into the
antitrust laws, which "are best served by insuring that the
private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone
contemplating [illegal] business behavior." Id., at 139. Accordingly, the opinion concluded that "the doctrine of in pari
delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not
to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." I d., at
140. The opinion reserved the question whether a plaintiff
who engaged in "truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme"-one who "aggressively support[ed] and further[ed] the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it"-could be barred from pursuing a
damages action, finding that the muffler dealers had relatively little bargaining power and that they had been coerced
by the franchisor into agreeing to many of the contract's provisions. Ibid.
In separate opinions, five Justices agreed that the concept
of "equal fault" should be narrowly defined in litigation aris14

See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1157; L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1197 (1983); Comment, Availability of an In Pari Delicto Defense in Rule 10b-5 Tippee Suits, 77 Colum.
L. Rev. 1084, 1086, n. 15 (1977).
!&Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S. C.§ 1 et seq.;
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 et seq., as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq.
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ing under federal regulatory statutes. 16 "[B]ecause of the
strong public interest in eliminating restraints on competition, . . . many of the refinements of moral worth demanded
of plaintiffs by ... many of the variations of in pari delicto
should not be applicable in the antitrust field." Id., at 151
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). The five Justices concluded, however, that where a plaintiff truly bore at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violation, a defense
based on such fault-whether or not denominated in pari delicto-should be recognized in antitrust litigation. 17
Bateman Eichler argues that Perma Life-with its empha- ·
sis on the importance of analyzing the effects that fault-based
defenses would have on the enforcement of congressional
goals-is of only marginal relevance to a private damages action under the federal securities laws. Specifically, Bateman
Eichler observes that Congress expressly provided for private antitrust actions-thereby manifesting a "desire to go
beyond the common law in the antitrust statute in order to
provide substantial encouragement to private enforcement
and to help deter anticompetitive conduct"-whereas private
rights of action under§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are merely implied from that provision 18-thereby,
See 392 U.S., at 145 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 147-148 (Fortas,
J., concurring in result); id., at 148-149, 151 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result); id., at 154-155 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
17
JUSTICE WHITE concluded that "the in pari delicto defense in its historic fonnulation is not a useful concept" in antitrust law, but emphasized
that he "would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them." I d., at 143,
146. The other four Justices would have allowed explicit, though limited,
use of the in pari delicto defense itself. I d., at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring
in result); id., at 148-149 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); id., at 153
(Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
8
' See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S.
16

6, 13, n. 9 (1971).

'

.
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apparently, supporting a broader application of the in pari
delicto defense. Brief for Petitioner 32. Bateman Eichler
buttresses this argument by observing that, unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the securities laws contain savings
provisions directing that "[t]he rights and remedies provided
by [those laws] shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity" 19-again,
apparently, supporting a broader scope for fault-based defenses than recognized in Perma Life.
We disagree. Nothing in Perma Life suggested that public policy implications should govern only where Congress expressly provides for private remedies; the classic formulation
of the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consideration of such implications before allowing the defense. See
supra, at--. Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized
that implied private actions provide "a most effective weapon
in the enforcement" of the securities laws and are "a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975). In addition, we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1983) (common-law
doctrines are sometimes of "questionable pertinence" in applying the securities laws, which were intended "to rectify
perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry"); A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene
Mines Corp., 312 U. S. 38, 43 (1941) (rejecting the uncleanhands defense on the facts of the case because it would "seriously hinder rather than aid the real purpose" of the securi11

See § 16 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77p;
§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15
U. S. C. § 78bb(a).

'

.
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ties laws). 20 We therefore conclude that the principles of
Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action
under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, a private
action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on
the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as
a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks
to redress, and (2) preclusion of recovery would be more consistent with the effective enforcement of the securities laws
and protection of the investing public.

A
The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the
assumption that the respondents had violated § lO(b) and
Rule lOb-5, see supra,
an assumption we accept for
purposes of resolving the issue before us. Cf. A. C. Frost &
Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co., supra, at40-41. 21 Bateman

at

20

In Frost, we quoted approvingly from an SEC memorandum arguing
that "'it appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in such a case, the
agreement is labelled "void" or the parties are held to be "in pari delicto."
There, labels, as often is the case, merely state the conclusion reached, but
do not aid in solution of the problem. The ultimate issue is whether the
result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the purposes of
the Act."' 312 U. S., at 44, n. 2.
21
We note, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the question of
the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the
complaint. A tippee generally has a duty to disclose or to abstain from
trading on material nonpublic information only when he knows or should
know that his insider source "has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information"-in other words, where the insider
has sought to "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 660, 662 (1983). Such benefit can derive from the
insider's use of the information to secure a "pecuniary gain," a "reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings," or simply to confer
"a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." I d., at
663-664. See also id., at 655, n. 14 (alternative basis for liability where
tippee has "entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and [is] given access to information solely for
corporate purposes"). Although the respondents certainly were aware
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Eichler contends that the respondents' delictum was substantially par to that of Lazzaro and Neadeau for two reasons. First, whereas many antitrust plaintiffs participate in
illegal restraints of trade only "passively" or as the result of
economic coercion, as was the case in Perma Life, the ordinary tippee acts voluntarily in choosing to trade on inside
that Lazzaro stood to gain from disclosure by the commissions he would
earn, it is uncertain whether they had any basis to believe that Neadeauthe insider from whose potential breach all liability flows-had violated his
fiduciary duties to TONM's shareholders by revealing the joint-venture information to Lazzaro. The respondents might well have believed that ·
Neadeau provided the information to Lazzaro as a favor or otherwise acted
against the shareholders' interests, but the complaint does not set forth
sufficient facts to conclude that this was the case.
In addition, we accept the lower courts' assumption about the respondents' violations notwithstanding the uncertain character of the information
the respondents traded on. The complaint rather strongly suggests that
much of the information Lazzaro conveyed about the explorations and
joint-venture negotiations was true, but that it was deceptive by virtue of
exaggeration and the failure to include additional material information.
See ~~ 10-12, 18, 20, 30, App. 8-9, 12-13, 15. If this was the case, and if
the respondents otherwise acquired a derivative duty within the meaning
of Dirks, there is no question that their trading on the basis of this information violated the securities laws. If the information was entirely false, the
SEC and Bateman Eichler contend that the respondents, by trading on
what they believed was material nonpublic information, are nevertheless
guilty of at least an attempted violation of the securities laws if they otherwise believed that Neadeau had breached his fiduciary duties. This view
has drawn substantial support among the lower courts. See, e. g., Tarasi
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1159-1160; Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 714; Grumet v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 564
F. Supp., at 340. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that they
could not have inherited any duty to disclose false information, and that the
case is properly viewed as governed by the doctrine of legal impossibility,
which would bar any liability, rather than factual impossibility, which
would permit liability on an attempt theory. See also Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions
After Dirks v. SEC, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 519, 540-542 (1984). Because this
issue has not been fully briefed and was not considered by the courts
below, we express no views on it and simply proceed on the assumption
that the respondents' activities rendered them in delicto.
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information. Second, § 10(b) and Rule 101:>-5 apply literally
to "any person" who violates their terms, and do not recognize gradations of culpability.
We agree that the typically voluntary nature of an investor's decision impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders
the investor more blameworthy than someone who is party to
a contract solely by virtue of another's overweening bargaining power. We disagree, however, that an investor who engages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a corporate insider or broker-dealer who discloses the information
for personal gain. Notwithstanding the broad reach of ·
§ lO(b) and Rule 101:>-5, there are important distinctions between the relative culpabillties of tipers, securities professiona s, I!_ 1 ees in these circumstances. The Court has
made clear in recent Terms that a tippee's use of material
nonpublic information does not violate§ 10(b) and Rule 101:>-5
un~e tippee owes a corresEonding_ duty to disclose th~
i~on. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-664 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980).
That duty typically is "derivative from . . . the insider's
duty." Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 659; see also id., at 664. In
other words, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty" toward corporate shareholders. Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 230, n. 12. 22
In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a
person whose liability is s~ can be said to be as
culpable as one whose breaeti of duty gave rise to that liability in the first place. 23
-~

?!/.We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he otherwise "misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information." Dirks v. SEC,
supra, at 665. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, pp. 14-15 (1983).
23
Our view is reinforced by Congress' recent enactment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C.A.
§ 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1985), which imposes civil penalties on nontrading
tippers out of belief that, "[a]bsent the tipper's misconduct, the tippee's

'

.
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Moreover, insiders and broker-dealers who selectively disclose material nonpublic information commit a potentially
broader range of violations than do tippees who trade on the
basis of that information. A tippee trading on inside in1 ty of fraud
formation will in man circu sta es be
agains m IVI ua shareholders, a violation for which the
tipp~. But the i!!~ider, in disclq_sing
su~tion, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties
tow~l . 24
nd in cases where the tipper
intentionally conveys false or materially incomplete information to the tippee, the tipper commits an additional violation:
fraud against the tippee. Such conduct is particularly egregious when committed by a securities professional, who owes
a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward his clients. Cf. 3
Pomeroy § 942a, at 741. 25 Absent other culpable actions by a
tippee that can fairly be said to outweigh these violations by
insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that the tippee
properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal
culpability as his tippers.
There is certainly nothing on the face of the complaint be-l
pariaelicto - - - - - ; ?
fore us to suggest that the respondents were
with Lazzaro and Neadeau. The allegations are that Lazzaro and Neadeau masterminded this scheme to manipulate
the market in TONM securities for tlieir own personal benefit, and that they used the purchaSing respondents as unwitting dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock. There-

in

trading would not occur" and that a tipper is therefore "most directly cul;>able in a violation," H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 9.
v 24 See Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 655; Note, supra n. 14, at 1094, and n. 64.
25
Under the Commission's "shingle theory," a broker-dealer who "hangs
out his shingle" makes a "broad basic representation to the public at large
that he will deal fairly with his customers and handle transactions , . . in
the usual manner and in accordance with trade custom." S. Jaffe, BrokerDealers and Securities Markets § 7.09, at 145 (1977). See also Duker &
Duker, 6 S. E. C. 386, 388-389 (1939); N. Wolfson, R. Phillips & T. Russo,
Regulation of Brokers, Dealers and Securities Markets~~ 2.03, 2.07 (1977)
(collecting cases).

1
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spondents may well have violated the securities laws, and in
any event we place no "stamp of approval" on their conduct.
Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 238 (STEVENS, J., concurring). But it is inescapable that, i( the allegations in ,..the
complaint are true, Lazzaro and Neadeau "awakened in [the
respondents] a Clesire for wrongful gain that might otherwise
have remained dormant, inspired in [their] mind[s] an unfounded idea that [they] were going to secure it, and th~b
fraud and false pretenses deprived [them] of__llheiJ!]--rtloney,"
Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321,~~), cert. denied,
203 U. S. 590 (1906)-conduct)ftore ~ulpable under any reasonable view than that of the respondents. 26
B

We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in
such circumstances will best promote the primary objective
of the federal securities laws-protection of the investing
public and the national economy through the promotion of "a
high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the
securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186-187 (1963). Although anumber of lower courts have reasoned that a broad rule of caveat
tippee would better serve this goal, 27 we believe the contrary
211

Bateman Eichler has sought a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment
solely on the grounds that the investors were in pari delicto with its employee Lazzaro. Amicus Securities Industry Association (SIA), however,
contends that the in pari delicto defense should in any event bar recovery
against a brokerage finn whose only role has been that of a "controlling
person" of the defrauding employee, see n. 1, supra, and whose liability is
therefore "vicarious" and "secondary." Brief of SIA as Amicus Curiae
20-24. This issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, and Bateman
Eichler has not raised it either in this Court or in the Ninth Circuit. We
therefore express no views with respect to the liability of brokerage finns
as "controlling persons" in cases such as this.
zrsee, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at
1163-1164; Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 705; Grumet v.
Shearson!American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp., at 340; Wohl v. Blair &
Co., 50 F. R. D., at 93.

.
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position adopted by other courts represents the better view. 28
To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent
practices going undetected by the authorities and unremedied. The Securities and Exchange Commission has advised us that it "does not have the resources to police the industry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does not occur
er is consistently discovered," and that "[w]ithout the
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively
prosecute false tipping-a difficult practice to detect." Brief .
for SEC as Amicus Curiae 25. See also H. R. Rep. No.
98-355, p. 6 (1983) ("In recent years, the securities markets
have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have declined"). Thus it is
particularly important to permit "litigation among guilty parties [that will serve] to expose their unlawful conduct and
render them more easily subject to appropriate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties." Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F. 2d 700, 706, n. 3·(CA5 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting). The in pari delicto defense, by denying any incentive to a defrauded tippee to bring suit against his defrauding
tipper, would significantly undermine this important goal. 29
See, e. g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 . (Godbold, J.,
dissenting); Kirkland v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp., at 435-436;
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp., at 54-57.
29
Our analysis is buttressed by reference to § 9(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e), which allows coconspirators a right of contribution against "any person who, if joined in
the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." This
provision overrides the common-law rule against contribution from coconspirators, which was grounded on the premise that "parties generally
in pari delicto should be left where they are found." Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 635 (1981). As the Commission observes, "[s]urely, the Congress that provided that a brokerage
professional such as Lazzaro could recover from his fellow manipulators
should be understood to have permitted the victims of Lazzaro's manipulative scheme to sue him." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 26.
28
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Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement
pressures to bear on the sources of such information-corporate insiders and broker-dealers.
"The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountainhead of the confidential information . . . . If the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all
material inside information until it is made available to
the investing public, then the most effective means of
carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of
the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from ·
'making the initial disclosure which is the first step in
the chain of dissemination.' This can most readily be
achieved by making unavailable to him the defense of in
pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon charges based
upon alleged misinformation." Nathanson v. W eis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57-58 (SDNY
1971).

In addition, corporate insiders · and broker-dealers will in
many circumstances be more responsive to the deterrent
pressure of potential sanctions; they are more likely than
ordinary investors to be advised by counsel and thereby to be
informed fully of the "allowable limits on their conduct."
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting). 30 Although situations might well arise in which the
relative culpabilities of the tippee and his insider source
merit a different mix of deterrent incentives, we therefore
conclude that in tipper-tippee situations such as the one~
30
It also has been suggested that "tippees constitute a potentially larger
class and deterrent measures aimed exclusively at tippees, even if proportionately as successful, will still leave a large number of violations undeterred. Thus, [even if] tippers and tippees are assumed to be equally
responsive to deterrent measures, it would appear preferable to increase
deterrent pressure against tippers by allowing tippee recovery." Note,
supra n. 14, at 1096-1097.
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fore us the factors discussed above preclude recognition of
the in pari delicto defense. 31
Lower courts reaching a contrary conclusion have typically
asserted that, absent a vigorous allowance of the in pari delicto defense, tippees would have, "in effect, an enforceable
warranty that secret information is true," id., at 705, and
thus no incentive not to trade on that information. 32 These
courts have reasoned, in other words, that tippees in such
circumstances would be in "the enviable position of 'heads-Iwin tails-you-lose,"' Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981)-if the tip is ·
correct, the tippee will reap illicit profits, while if the tip fails
to yield the expected return, he can sue to recover damages.
We believe the "enforceable warranty" theory is overstated and overlooks significant factors that serve to deter
tippee trading irrespective of whether the in pari delicto defense is allowed. First, tippees who bring suit in an attempt
to cash in on their "enforceable warranties" expose themselves to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties
for their own potentially illegal conduct. 33 Second, plaintiffs
31
Some courts have suggested that "even where the fault of plaintiff and
defendant were relatively equal, simultaneous and mutual, the court might
still reject the [in pari delicto] defense if it appeared that the defendant's
unlawful activities were o( a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the
investing public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to control that impact is with defendant." Woolfv. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d,
at 604; see also Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co. , 615 F. 2d, at 76, n. 6. Because we conclude that the complaint in this case does not demonstrate that
the respondents bore substantially equal responsibility for the violations
they seek to redress, we need not resolve this question here.
32
See, e. g. , Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F . 2d 1074, 1082 (CA5 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F.
2d, at 1163-1164; In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F . Supp., at 179-180.
33
In addition to potential liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, investors also are subject to liability under §§ 2 and 3 of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u(d)(2), 78ff(a)
(Supp. 1985), which imposes severe civil sanctions on persons who have illegally used inside information, as well as criminal fines of up to $100,000.

..
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in litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may only recover
against defendants who have acted with scienter. See Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). Thus "if the tip
merely fails to 'pan out' or if the information itself proves accurate but the stock fails to move in the anticipated direction,
the investor stands to lose all of his investment. Only in the
situation where the investor has been deliberately defrauded
will he be able to maintain a private suit in an attempt to recoup his money."· 730 F. 2d, at 1324, n. 3. 34
We therefore conclude that the public interest will most
frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to
bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate insiders and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate
sanctions. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in this case,
there is no warrant to giving corporate insiders and brokerdealers "a license to defraud the investing public with little
fear of prosecution." I d., at 1323.
Affirmed.

34
The SEC also argues that courts should deter tippees in cases such as
this by limiting potential recovery to out-of-pocket losses. The courts
below did not address this issue, and we express no views on the proper
measure of relief. Cf. Pe:rma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U. S., at 140.
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BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS,
INCORPORATED, PETITIONER v.
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF /} /.
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
~ -y [May - , 1985]
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the common-law in pari delicto defense bars a private damages
action under the federal secp.rities laws against corporate
insiders and broker-dealers who fraudulently induce investors to purchase securities by misrepresenting that they are
conveying material nonpublic information about the issuer.
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I
The respondent investors filed this action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,
alleging that they incurred substantial trading losses as a
result of a conspiracy between Charles Lazzaro, a registered
securities broker employed by the petitioner Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler), and Leslie
Neadeau, President ofT. 0. N. M. Oil & Gas Exploration
Corporation (TONM), to induce them to purchase large quantities of TONM over-the-counter stock by divulging false and
materially incomplete information about the company on the
pretext that it was accurate inside information. 1 Specifi'The investors named Lazzaro, Neadeau, TONM, and Bateman Eichler
as defendants. Complaint ~~5-8 , App. 7-8. The investors charged that
Neadeau and TONM had "directly and indirectly participated with, aided
and abetted, and conspired with" Lazzaro in the scheme. I d. ~ 9, App. 8;
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cally, Lazzaro is alleged to have told the respondents that he
personally knew TONM insiders and had learned, inter alia,
that (a) "[ v]ast amounts of gold had been discovered in Surinam, and TONM had options on thousands of acres in goldproducing regions of Surinam"; 2 (b) the discovery was "not
publicly known, but would subsequently be announced"; (c)
TONM was currently engaged in negotiations with other
companies to form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese
gold; and (d) when this information was made public, "TONM
stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share,
would increase in value from $10 to $15/share within a short
period of time, and ... might increase to $100/share" within
a year. Complaint ~~16-17, App. 10-12. 3 Some of the
respondents aver that they contacted Neadeau and inquired
whether Lazzaro's tips were accurate; Neadeau stated that
the information was "not public knowledge" and "would neisee also id. 1140, App. 17. Bateman Eichler's liability was premised on its
status as a "controlling person" of Lazzaro within the meaning of § 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U. S. C. § 78t(a).
Complaint 11115, 39, App. 7, 16-17. · Seen. 26, infra.
Although Lazzaro, Neadeau, and TONM also are respondents in this
Court, see Sup. Ct. Rule 19.6, we shall use "respondents" to refer exclusively to the investor plaintiffs, who are defending the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this Court.
2
Gold exploration has been conducted in Surinam for more than 100
years, but production has declined dramatically since early in this century.
Complaint 1111, App. 9. The areas in which TONM had been engaged in
exploration "were historically mined by Surinamese natives using
primative methods," and were accessible to the outside world "primarily
by motorized canoes and helicopter." !d. 1112, App. 9. Lazzaro allegedly
told the investors that TONM's discovery "compared favorably to, if not
better than, those in South Africa," and that development "would not
require deep mining" because "[g]eologists in Surinam were finding gold
nuggets in dry creek beds." ld. 1116, App. 11.
3
Lazzaro also allegedly told the investors that, after the announcement,
TONM share~olders "would automatically receive" additional stock in
TONM's subsidiary, International Gold and Diamond Exploration Corp.,
Inc., "without the payment of any additional monies." Ibid. (emphasis in
original).
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ther confirm nor deny those claims," but allegedly advised
that "Lazzaro was a very trustworthy and a good man." I d.
~ 19, App. 12.
The respondents admitted in their complaint that they purchased TONM stock, much of it through Lazzaro, "on the
premise that Lazzaro was privy to certain information not
otherwise available to the general public." I d. ~ 15, App. 10.
Their shares initially increased dramatically in price, but ultimately declined to substantially below the purchase price
when the joint mining venture fell through. I d. ~~ 22-26,
App. 13-14. 4
Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made the representations set forth above knowing that the representations
"were untrue and/or contained only half-truths, material
omissions of fact and falsehoods,'' 5 intending that the respondents would rely thereon, and for the purpose of "influenc[ing] and manipulat[ing] the price of TONM stock" so as
"to profit themselves through the taking of commissions and
secret profits." Id. ~~23, 30, 38, App. 13, 15-16. 6 The
• The respondents purchased the stock in late 1979 and early 1980 for
between $1.50 and $3.00 per share, and the price of the stock rose to $7.00
per share by the fourth quarter of !980. /d. ~ 22, App. 13. "[S]ome or
all" of the respondents claim to have told Lazzaro at this time that they
wanted to sell their shares, but "Lazzaro stated that he would let the plaintiffs know when to sell the TONM stock, and that they should not sell just
because the stock had reached $7.00/share because it would go higher still. "
Ibid. The stock then plummeted "to approximately $1.00 per share" by
the end of 1980, and fell to "less than $1.00 a share" early the next year.
/d. ~~ 24-25, App. 14.
5
In the alternative, Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made
these representations "recklessly with wanton disregard for the truth."
I d. ~ 32, App. 15.
8
Neadeau is alleged to have owned approximately 100,000 shares of the
outstanding common stock of TONM, and Lazzaro is alleged to have "controlled over a million shares of TONM stock through stocks purchased by
himself and his clients." /d. ~~ 8, 23, App. 8, 13. See also id. ~ 16, App.
12 ("Lazzaro and his relatives owned a large block of TONM stock"). The
investors charged that "Lazzaro could thereby and did influence and
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respondents contended that this scheme violated, inter alia,
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891,
15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), 7 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1984). 8 They sought capital losses and lost profits, punitive damages, and costs and
attorney's fees. App. 26. 9
manipulate the price of TONM stock through purchases and sales thereof,
and through the dissemination of false information to plaintiffs and others."
Id. 1123, App. 13.
7
That section provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
8
That rule provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
9
In addition, the respondents sought recovery pursuant to § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), see
Complaint 111148-50, App. 20, which the parties and the courts below have
treated as comparable to § 10(b) for purposes of applying the in pari delicto
defense. We express no view as to whether a private right of action exists
under § 17(a). Compare Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F. 2d 413, 416 (CA5 1983),
with Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808, 815 (CA9
1981). The respondents also alleged various other federal claims and
pendent state-law claims that are not before us.
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The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. The court reasoned that "trading on insider
information is itself a violation of rule 10b--5" and that the
allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the respondents themselves had "violated the particular provision under
which recovery is sought." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.
Thus, the court concluded, the respondents were in pari delicto with Lazzaro and Neadeau and absolutely barred from
recovery. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 730
F. 2d 1319 (1984). Although it assumed that the respondents had violated the federal securities laws, id., at 1324, the
court nevertheless concluded that "securities professionals
and corporate officers who have allegedly engaged in fraud
should not be permitted to invoke the in pari delicto doctrine
to .shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudulent misrepresentation," id., at 1320. The Court of Appeals
noted that this Court had sharply restricted the availability
of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, see Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S.
134 (1968), and concluded thah essentially for three reasons,
there was no basis "for creating a different rule for private
actions initiated under the federal securities laws," 730 F. 2d,
at 1322. First, the court reasoned that, in cases such as this,
defrauded tippees are not in fact "equally responsible" for the
violations they allege. I d., at 1322. Second, the court believed that allowing the defense in these circumstances would
be "totally incompatible with the overall aims of the securities law" because the threat of a private damages action is
necessary to deter "insider-tipster[s]" from defrauding the
public. Id., at 1323. Finally, the court noted the availability of means other than an outright preclusion of suit to
deter tippees from trading on inside information. I d., at
1324, n. 3.

84-679-0PINION
BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, INC. v. BERNER

6

The lower courts have divided over the proper scope of the
in pari delicto defense in securities litigation. 10 We granted
certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1985). We affirm.
II
The common-law defense at issue in this case derives from·
the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: "in a
case of equal fault the position of the defending party is the
better one." 11 The defense is grounded on two premises:
first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; 12 and second, that denying
0

See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d 1152 (CA3)
(allowing defense), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 965 (1977); Malamphy v. RealTex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975) (per curiam) (sustaining
submission of defense to jury); Woolf v. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591,
601-605 (CA5 1975) (rejecting defense on facts of case), on reh'g, 521 F. 2d
225, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976);
Keuhnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d 700 (CA5 1969) (allowing defense);
Kirkland v. E . F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 433-437 (ED Mich.
1983) (rejecting defense on motion for summary judgment); Grumet v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc ., 564 F. Supp. 336 (NJ 1983) (allowing
defense); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F . Supp. 882,
884-887 (SD Fla. 1981) (rejecting defense on motion to dismiss); Moholt v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (DC 1979) (rejecting defense
on motion for summary judgment); In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F.
Supp. 172, 177-180 (SDNY 1978) (allowing defense); Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (SDNY 1971) (rejecting defense);
Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F. R. D. 89 (SDNY 1970) (denying motion to
strike defense). Cf. Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
710 F . 2d 678, 691 (CA111983); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co. , 615 F. 2d 68,
76 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981); Can-Am Petroleum Co.
v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373 (CAlO 1964).
11
Black's Law Dictionary 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1977).
12
See, e. g., Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U.S. 671, 685 (1886); Austin's
Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'r, 11 Va. 33, 47 (1806) ("He who comes here for
relief must draw his justice from pure fountains"). See also Holman v.
Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K. B. 1775):
"The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is
not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed . . . . The
'
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judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means
of deten-ing illegality. 13 In its classic formulation, the in
pari delicto defense was nan-owly limited to situations where
the plaintiff truly bore at least equal responsibility for his
injury, because "in cases where both parties are in delicto,
concun-ing in an illegal act, it does not always follow that
they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are,
very different degrees in their guilt." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 304-305 (1886) (Story).
Thus there might be an "inequality of condition" between the
parties, id., at 305, or "a confidential relationship between
th[em]" that determined their "relative standing" before a
court, 3 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence
§ 942a, at 741 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy). In addition, the
public policy considerations that undergirded the in pari delicto defense were frequently construed as precluding the defense even where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his
injury: "there may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public policy in
many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties
may be." 1 Story 305. Notwithstanding these traditional
limitations, many courts have given the in pari delicto
defense a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs
simply have been involved generally in "the same sort of
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio [out of fraud
no action arises] . . . . It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the
sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a
plaintiff."
8
' See, e. g. , McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-670 (1898):
"To refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the
enforcement of his alleged rights under it tends strongly towards reducing
the number of such transactions to a minimum. The more plainly parties
understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place
themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined will they be
to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid
adherence to the law."
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wrongdoing" as defendants. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U. 8., at 138. 14
In Perma Life, we emphasized "the inappropriateness of
invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private
suit serves important public purposes." 392 U. S., at 138.
That case involved a treble-damages action against a Midas
Muffler franchisor by several of its dealers, who alleged that
the franchise agreement created a conspiracy to restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 The
lower courts barred the action on the grounds that the dealers, as parties to the agreement, were in pari delicto with
the franchisor. In reversing that determination, the opinion
for this Court emphasized that there was no indication that
Congress had intended to incorporate the defense into the
antitrust laws, which "are best served by insuring that the
private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone
contemplating [illegal] business behavior." I d., at 139. Accordingly, the opinion concluded that "the doctrine of in pari
delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effe~ts, is not
to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." I d., at
140. The opinion reserved the question whether a plaintiff
who engaged in "truly compfete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme"-one who "aggressively support[ed] and further[ed] the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it"-could be barred from pursuing a
damages action, finding that the muffler dealers had relatively little bargaining power and that they had been coerced
by the franchisor into agreeing to many of the contract's provisions. Ibid.
,. See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1157; L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1197 (1983); Comment, Availability of an In Pari Delicto Defense in Rule 101>--5 Tippee Suits, 77 Colum.
L. Rev. 1084, 1086, n. 15 (1977).
6
' Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S. C. § 1 et seq.;
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 et seq., as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq.
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In separate opinions, five Justices agreed that the concept
of "equal fault" should be narrowly defined in litigation arising under federal regulatory statutes. 16 "[B]ecause of the
strong public interest in eliminating restraints on competition, ... many of the refinements of moral worth demanded
of plaintiffs by ... many of the variations of in pari delicto
should not be applicable in the antitrust field." Id., at 151
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). The five Justices concluded, however, that where a plaintiff truly bore at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violation, a defense
based on such fault-whether or not denominated in pari delicto-should be recognized in antitrust litigation. 17
Bateman Eichler argues that Perma Life-with its emphasis on the importance of analyzing the effects that fault-based
defenses would have on the enforcement of congressional
goals-is of only marginal relevance to a private damages action under the federal securities laws. Specifically, Bateman
Eichler observes that Congress expressly provided for private antitrust actions-thereby manifesting a "desire to go
beyond the common law in the antitrust statute in order to
provide substantial encouragement to private enforcement
and to help deter anticompetitive conduct"-whereas private
rights of action under§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
16
See 392 U. S., at 145 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 147-148 (Fortas,
J., concurring in result); id., at 148-149, 151 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result); id., at 154-155 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
17
JusTICE WHITE concluded that "the in pari delicto defense in its historic formulation is not a useful concept" in antitrust law, but emphasized
that he "would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them." Id., at 143,
146. The other four Justices would have allowed explicit, though limited,
use of the in pari delicto defense itself. I d., at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring
in result); id., at 148-149 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); id., at 153
(Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

'

.
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of 1934 are merely implied from that provision 18-thereby,
apparently, supporting a broader application of the in pari
delicto defense. Brief for Petitioner 32. Bateman Eichler
buttresses this argument by observing that, unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the securities laws contain savings
provisions directing that "[t]he rights and remedies provided
by [those laws] shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity" 19-again,
apparently, supporting a broader scope for fault-based defenses than recognized in Perma Life.
We disagree. Nothing in Perma Life suggested that public policy implications should govern only where Congress expressly provides for private remedies; the classic formulation
of the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consideration of such implications before allowing the defense. See
supra, at - - . Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized
that implied private actions provide "a most effective weapon
in the enforcement" of the securities laws and are "a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975). In addition, we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws. ' See, e. g., Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1983) (common-law
doctrines are sometimes of "questionable pertinence" in applying the securities laws, which were intended "to rectify
perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry"); A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene
Mines Corp., 312 U. S. 38, 43 (1941) (rejecting the unclean18
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores , 421 U. S. 723, 730
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S.
6, 13, n. 9 (1971).
19
See § 16 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77p;
§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15
U. S. C. § 78bb(a).
·
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hands defense on the facts of the case because it would "seriously hinder rather than aid the real purpose" of the securities laws). 20 We therefore conclude that the principles of
Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action
under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, a private
action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on
the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as
a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks
to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not measurably
interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws
and protection of the investing public.
A

The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the
assumption that the respondents had violated § lO(b) and
Rule lOb-5, see supra, at ---an assumption we accept
for purposes of resolving the issue before us. Cf. A. C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co., supra, at 40-41. 21
20
In Frost, we quoted approvingly from an SEC memorandum arguing
that "'it appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in such a case, the
agreement is labelled "void" or the parties are held to be "in pari delicto."
There, labels, as often is the case, rperely state the conclusion reached, but
do not aid in solution of the prob,lem. The ultimate issue is whether the
result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the purposes of
the Act."' 312 U. S., at 44, n. 2.
21
We note, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the question of
the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the
complaint. A tippee generally has a duty to disclose or to abstain from
trading on material nonpublic information only when he knows or should
know that his insider source "has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information"-in other words, where the insider
has sought to "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 660, 662 (1983). Such benefit can derive from the
insider's use of the information to secure a "pecuniary gain," a "reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings," or simply to confer
"a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." I d., at
663-664. See also id., at 655, n. 14 (alternative basis for liability where
tippee has "entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of

'

.
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Bateman Eichler contends that the respondents' delictum
was substantially par to that of Lazzaro and Neadeau for two
reasons. First, whereas many antitrust plaintiffs participate in illegal restraints of trade only "passively" or as the
the business of the enterprise and [is] given access to information solely for
corporate purposes"). Although the respondents certainly were aware
that Lazzaro stood to gain from disclosure by the commissions he would
earn, it is uncertain whether they had any basis to believe that Neadeauthe insider from whose potential breach all liability flows-had violated his
fiduciary duties to TONM's shareholders by revealing the joint-venture information to Lazzaro. The respondents might well have believed that
Neadeau provided the information to Lazzaro as a favor or otherwise acted
against the shareholders' interests, but the complaint does not set forth
sufficient facts to conclude that this was the case.
In addition, we accept the lower courts' assumption about the respondents' violations notwithstanding the uncertain character of the information
the respondents traded on. The complaint rather strongly suggests that
much of the information Lazzaro conveyed about the explorations and
joint•venture negotiations was true, but that it was deceptive by virtue of
exaggeration and the failure to include additional material information.
See 111110-12, 18, 20, 30, App. 8-9, 12-13, 15. If this was the case, and if
the respondents otherwise acquired a derivative duty within the meaning
of Dirks, there is no question that their trading on the basis of this information violated the securities laws. If the information was entirely false, the
SEC and Bateman Eichler contend that the respondents, by trading on
what they believed was material nonpublic information, are nevertheless
guilty of at least an attempted violation of the securities laws if they otherwise believed that Neadeau had breached his fiduciary duties. This view
has drawn substantial support among the lower courts. See, e. g., Tarasi
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1159-1160; Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 714; Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564
F. Supp., at 340. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that they
could not have inherited any duty to disclose false information, and that the
case is properly viewed as governed by the doctrine of legal impossibility,
which would bar any liability, rather than factual impossibility, which
would permit liability on an attempt theory. See also Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions
After Dirks v. SEC, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 519, 540-542 (1984). Because this
issue has not been fully briefed and was not considered by the courts
below, we express no views on it and simply proceed on the assumption
that the respondents' activities rendered them in delicto.
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result of economic coercion, as was the case in Perma Life,
the ordinary tippee acts voluntarily in choosing to trade on
inside information. Second, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply literally to "any person" who violates their terms, and do not
recognize gradations of culpability.
We agree that the typically voluntary nature of an investor's decision impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders
the investor more blameworthy than someone who is party to
a contract solely by virtue of another's overweening bargaining power. We disagree, however, that an investor who engages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a corporate insider or broker-dealer who discloses the information
for personal gain. Notwithstanding the broad reach of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there are important distinctions between the relative culpabilities of tippers, securities professionals, and tippees in these circumstances. The Court has
made clear in recent Terms that a tippee's use of material
nonpublic information does not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
unless the tippee .owes a corresponding duty to disclose the
information. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 654-664 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980).
That duty typically is "derivative from . . . the insider's
duty." Dirks v. SEC, suprcr, at 659; see also id., at 664. In
'other words, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty" toward corporate shareholders. Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 230, n. 12. 22
In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a
person whose liability is solely derivative can be said to be as
culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that liability in the first place. 23
'l!l.We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he otherwise "misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information." Dirks v. SEC,
supra, at 665. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, pp. 14-15 (1983).
23
Our view is reinforced by Congress' recent enactment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C. A.

'
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Moreover, insiders and broker-dealers who selectively disclose material nonpublic information commit a potentially
broader range of violations than do tippees who trade on the
basis of that information. A tippee trading on inside information will in many circumstances be guilty of fraud
against individual shareholders, a violation for which the
tipper shares responsibility. But the insider, in disclosing
such information, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties
toward the issuer itself. 24 And in cases where the tipper
intentionally conveys false or materially incomplete information to the tippee, the tipper commits an additional violation:
fraud against the tippee. Such conduct is particularly egregious when committed by a securities professional, who owes
a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward his clients. Cf. 3
Pomeroy§ 942a, at 741. Absent other culpable actions by a
tippee that can fairly be said to outweigh these violations by
insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that the tippee
properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal
culpability as his tippers.
There is certainly no basis for concluding at this stage of
this litigation that the respondents were in pari delicto with
Lazzaro and Neadeau. The allegations are that Lazzaro and
Neadeau masterminded this 'scheme to manipulate the market in TONM securities for their own personal benefit, and
that they used the purchasing respondents as unwitting
dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock. The respondents
may well have violated the securities laws, and in any event
we place no "stamp of approval" on their conduct. Chiarella
v. United States, supra, at 238 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
But accepting the facts set forth in the complaint as true-as
we must in reviewing the District Court's dismissal on the
§ 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1985), which imposes civil penalties on nontrading
tippers out of belief that, "[a]bsent the tipper's misconduct, the tippee's
trading would not occur" and that a tipper is therefore "most directly culpable in a violation," H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 9.
24
See Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 655; Note, supra n. 14, at 1094, and n. 64.

)
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pleadings-Lazzaro and Neadeau "awakened in [the respondents] a desire for wrongful gain that might otherwise have remained dormant, inspired in [their] mind[s] an unfounded
idea that [they] were going to secure it, and then by fraud
and false pretenses deprived [them] of [their] money," Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321, 328-329 (CA8), cert. denied, 203
U. S. 590 (1906)-actions that, if they occurred, were far
more culpable under any reasonable view than the respondents' alleged conduct. 25
B
We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in
such circumstances will best promote the primary objective
of the federal securities laws-protection of the investing
public and the national economy through the promotion of "a
high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the
securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu- ..
reau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186-187 (1963). Although anumber of lower courts have reasoned that a broad rule of caveat
tippee would better serve this goal, 26 we believe the contrary
position adopted by other courts represents the bette~ view.2:1
26
Bateman Eichler has sought a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment
solely on the grounds that the inv~stors were in pari delicto with its employee Lazzaro. Amicus Securities Industry Association (SIA), however,
contends that the in pari delicto defense should in any event bar recovery
against a brokerage firm whose only role has been that of a "controlling
person" of the defrauding employee, see n. 1, supra, and whose liability is
therefore "vicarious" and "secondary." Brief of SIA as Amicus Curiae
20-24. This issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, and Bateman
Eichler has not raised it either in this Court or in the Ninth Circuit. We
therefore express no views with respect to the liability of brokerage firms
as "controlling persons" in cases such as this.
26
See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at
1163-1164; Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 705; Gmmet v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp., at 340; Wohl v. Blair &
Co., 50 F. R. D., at 93.
27
See, e. g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J.,
dissenting); Kirkland v. E. F . Hutton & Co., 564 F . Supp., at 435-436;
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp., at 54-57.

'
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To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent
practices going undetected by the authorities and unremedied. The Securities and Exchange Commission has advised us that it "does not have the resources to police the industry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does not occur
or is consistently discovered," and that "[w]ithout the
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively
prosecute false tipping-a difficult practice to detect." Brief
for SEC as Amicus Curiae 25. See also H. R. Rep. No.
98-355, p. 6 (1983) ("In recent years, the securities markets
have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have declined"). Thus it is
particularly important to permit "litigation among guilty parties [that will serve] to expose their unlawful conduct and
render them more easily subject to appropriate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties." Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F. 2d 700, 706, n. 3 (CA5 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting).. The in pari delicto defense, by denying any incentive to a defrauded tippee to bring suit against his defrauding
tipper, would significantly undermine this important goal. 28
Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement
pressures to bear on the sources of such information-corporate insiders and broker-dealers.
28

Our analysis is buttressed by reference to § 9(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e), which allows coconspirators a right of contribution against "any person who, if joined in
the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." This
provision overrides the common-law rule against contribution from coconspirators, which was grounded on the premise that "parties generally
in pari delicto should be left where they' are found." Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc ., 451 U. S. 630, 635 (1981). As the Commission observes, "[s]urely, the Congress that provided that a brokerage
professional such as Lazzaro could recover from his fellow manipulators
should be understood to have permitted the victims of Lazzaro's manipulative scheme to sue him." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 26.
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"The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountainhead of the confidential information . . . . If the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all
material inside information until it is made available to
the investing public, then the most effective means of
carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of
the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from
'making the initial disclosure which is the first step in
the chain of dissemination.' This can most readily be .
achieved by making unavailable to him the defense of in
pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon charges based
upon alleged misinformation." Nathanson v. W eis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57-58 (SDNY
1971).

In addition, corporate insiders and broker-dealers will in
many circumstances be · more responsive to the deterrent
pressure of potential sanctions; they are more likely than
ordinary investors to be advised by counsel and thereby to be
informed fully of the "allowable limits on their conduct."
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting). 29 Although situations might well arise in which the
relative culpabilities of the tippee and his insider source
merit a different mix of deterrent incentives, we therefore
conclude that in tipper-tippee situations such as the one before us the factors discussed above preclude recognition of
the in pari delicto defense. 30
29
It also has been suggested that "tippees constitute a potentially larger
class and deterrent measures aimed exclusively at tippees, even if proportionately as successful, will still leave a large number of violations undeterred. Thus, [even if] tippers and tippees are assumed to be equally
responsive to deterrent measures, it would appear preferable to increase
deterrent pressure against tippers by allowing tippee recovery. " Note,
supra n. 14, at 1096-1097.
30
Some courts have suggested that "even where the fault of plaintiff and
defendant were relatively equal, simultaneous and mutual, the court might
still reject the [in pari delicto} defense if it appeared that the defendant's
unlawful activities were of a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the
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Lower courts reaching a contrary conclusion have typically
asserted that, absent a vigorous allowance of the in pari delicto defense, tippees would have, "in effect, an enforceable
warranty that secret information is true," id., at 705, and
thus no incentive not to trade on that information. 31 These
courts have reasoned, in other words, that tippees in such
circumstances would be in "the enviable position of 'heads-1win tails-you-lose,"' Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981)-if the tip is
correct, the tippee will reap illicit profits, while if the tip fails
to yield the expected return, he can sue to recover damages.
We believe the "enforceable warranty" theory is overstated and overlooks significant factors that serve to deter
tippee trading irrespective of whether the in pari delicto defense is allowed. First, tippees who bring suit in an attempt
to cash in on their "enforceable warranties" expose themselves to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties
for their own potentially illegal conduct. 32 Second, plaintiffs
in litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10lr5 may only recover
against defendants who have acted with scienter. See Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). Thus "if the tip
merely fails to 'pan out' or if the information itself proves acinvesting public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to con. trol that impact is with defendant." Woolfv. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d,
at 604; see also Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F. 2d, at 76, n. 6. Because there is no basis at this stage of the litigation for concluding that the
respondents bore substantially equal responsibility for the violations they
seek to redress, we need not address the circumstances in which suit might
be allowed notwithstanding the plaintiff's substantially equal fault.
31
See, e. g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082 (CA5 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F.
2d, at 1163-1164; In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp., at 179-180.
32
In addition to potential liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, investors also are subject to liability under §§ 2 and 3 of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u(d)(2),
78ff(a) (Supp. 1985), which imposes severe civil sanctions on persons who
have illegally used inside information, as well as criminal fines of up to
$100,000.
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curate but the stock fails to move in the anticipated direction,
the investor stands to lose all of his investment. Only in the
situation where the investor has been deliberately defrauded
will he be able to maintain a private suit in an attempt to recoup his money." 730 F. 2d, at 1324, n. 3. 33
We therefore conclude that the public interest will most
frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to
bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate insiders and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate
sanctions. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in this case,
there is no warrant to giving corporate insiders and brokerdealers "a license to defraud the investing public with little
fear of prosecution." I d. , at 1323.
Affirmed.

38
The SEC also argues that courts should deter tippees in cases such as
this by limiting potential recovery to out-of-pocket losses. The courts
below did not address this issue, and we express no views on the proper
measure of relief. Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U. S. , at 140.
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I have held off joining your circulation because of
views similar to those expressed by Byron. Your letter to
him of May 28th goes a long way towards solving my problem,
and I would be happy to join if you could make two
additional minor changes on page 11:
(1) In the first full sentence on the page, could you
substitute the phrase "views expressed in the Perma Life
opinions" for the phrase "the principles of Perma Life"?
They may mean the same thing, but I would like it made clear
that it is not just the Court's opinion which is referred
to, but the five concurrences.
(2) In your reformulation of the standard in your
letter of May 28th, the second part speaks of the defense of
inpari delicto being allowed only where its use "could not
measurably interfere" with the effect of enforcement of the
securities laws •••• " To me the word "measurably" as an
adverb in a sentence dealing with legal matters barely
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securities laws and protection of the investing public."
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